Gillian Mackay and Ross Greer’s Scottish Greens announced their manifesto for the Scottish Parliament election this week. We’ll go through the main announcements on tax, spending and public sector reform, and we’ll look at whether the level of detail matches what we would expect from a manifesto.
Tax: and extensive offering, but with significant gaps
The Greens have the most extensive tax section of any manifesto so far, but detail on costings and delivery is largely absent. This makes it difficult to analyse how much these policies are likely to raise in tax revenue, and whether that would be sufficient to fund the spending commitments elsewhere in the manifesto.
Council tax
The Greens have committed to abolishing council tax and replacing it with a Residential Property Tax (RPT) based on current property valuations, with mandatory revaluations at least every five years. It is good to see a party engaging seriously with the problems of the current council tax system, which is based on 35-year-old valuations and has become increasingly regressive over time. However, the manifesto does not discuss the revenue implications of moving to a new system. If the RPT is designed to be revenue neutral – raising the same total as council tax – there will inevitably be winners and losers from the shift in how that total is distributed across properties.
The administrative cost of conducting and maintaining regular property revaluations across Scotland is also significant and entirely unaddressed. The manifesto is silent on whether this cost would be met from within RPT revenues – implying higher total tax take than under the current system – or funded from elsewhere. That distinction matters for assessing the true fiscal impact of the reform.
The Greens have also committed to introducing a mansion tax on properties valued at £1 million or more, via two new council tax bands. This is the same policy announced by the SNP in the January 2026 budget, so it does not represent a new ambition. The manifesto also fails to address how the new bands would treat asset-rich, cash-poor households – pensioners in high-value properties being the most obvious example – who may face substantially higher bills without the liquid income to meet them.
Finally, the Greens propose transferring council tax liability on rental properties from tenants to landlords, with a five-year transition period. The manifesto does not address the risk of landlords passing this additional cost on through higher rents, or the effect on rental supply should some landlords choose to exit the market rather than absorb it – more later on what the impact of this would be for the rental market.
Land and buildings transaction tax
The Greens commit to reforming land and buildings transaction tax (LBTT) rates and exemptions to raise more revenue, but provide no detail on what those new rates would be or who would be affected. They propose a 15% mansion tax rate on properties purchased for over £1 million, a higher rate for businesses buying residential property, and a 20% rate for overseas buyers. No revenue estimates are provided for any of these measures. It is worth noting that a proportion of any projected yield would be lost to behavioural responses – for example through reduced market activity at higher price points and a bunching of transactions just below the £1 million threshold to avoid the higher rate.
On the additional dwelling supplement (ADS), the Greens propose increasing the rate from 8% to 10% and introducing a multiplying surcharge for each additional property purchased, with the explicit aim of discouraging landlords from accumulating multiple properties. The cumulative effect of these LBTT reforms – higher mansion tax rates, overseas buyer surcharges, increased ADS, and a multiplying surcharge – would make Scotland’s property transaction tax regime the highest in the UK by a significant margin. The implications for market activity and rental supply go beyond the individual policies and are not addressed in the manifesto.
Income tax
The Greens have committed to retaining a “progressive and redistributive Income Tax system”. This is a very broad statement and tells votes nothing about what they could expect over the next five years. There is no reference to thresholds, rates, or fiscal drag, meaning that even with no active policy change to the current system, the real tax burden on Scottish taxpayers could rise over the parliament.
The Greens also propose setting a higher tax rate on landlords’ income from rental properties, mirroring a policy introduced for the rest of the UK by the UK Government. They note this would be introduced alongside rent controls to limit the ability of landlords to pass costs onto tenants – which is good to see reference to as often polices that increase costs for landlords are passed on to tenants through higher rents. However, the manifesto does not address what impact a higher tax rate on rental income would have on the supply of private rental properties, should landlords be disincentivised from renting out their properties altogether.
The proposal to “challenge the UK Government to accept that the power to tax income from shares and dividends is devolved” is presented as a tax policy, but taxation of dividends and share income has always been reserved to Westminster. Unless the Greens are planning to negotiate the devolution of these powers with the UK Government – which the manifesto does not make clear – this cannot be treated as a deliverable policy commitment.
Non-domestic rates
The Greens propose devolving business rate-setting powers to local councils. This has merits in allowing rates to reflect local economic conditions, but creates challenges for businesses operating across multiple local authority areas and could create incentives to locate in lower-rate areas, with consequences for the tax bases of councils they leave.
The manifesto also commits to reforming the Small Business Bonus Scheme (SBBS) to better support “genuine small businesses” while reducing its overall cost – implying that business rates will rise for at least some businesses currently receiving the relief. No detail is provided on which businesses would be affected. The Greens also propose using business rates surcharges on environmentally harmful businesses to fund public health investment, but provide no rates, yield estimates, or administrative detail. If these revenues are intended to fund specific spending commitments, the complete absence of any fiscal estimate makes it impossible to assess whether the overall package is deliverable.
Other taxes and new taxes
The Greens propose replacing Air Departure Tax with a frequent flyer levy and introducing a domestic flight surcharge, but provide no planned rates or detail on how different categories of travel would be defined for administrative purposes. Landfill Tax rates would also increase, again without any new rate specified.
A Scottish Wealth Tax is flagged as a development priority. It is worth noting that wealth taxes are notoriously difficult to implement in practice – particularly in isolation from the rest of the UK, where high-wealth individuals could shift assets or relocate across the border to avoid the charge. The Greens also propose a list of entirely new taxes, including a Carbon Emission Land Tax, a Cruise Ship levy, and a tourism entry levy. None of these come with any detail on rates, scope, or projected yield.
Public spending: ambitious but uncosted
Welfare and childcare
The Green’s welfare and childcare offer is the most expansive of any party but comes with the least detail on cost or funding.
The Greens propose increasing the Scottish Child Payment (SCP) to £40 per week immediately, with an aim of reaching at least £55 by 2030. This is the most generous SCP commitment of any party and would be meaningful in tackling child poverty. However, the cost of delivering these increases is not addressed anywhere in the manifesto. It is also worth noting that a higher payment sharpens the cliff-edge effect at the point of eligibility withdrawal, potentially creating stronger incentives for some households to limit their earnings to remain within the threshold.
On childcare, the Greens are offering the most universal and the most generous package of any party. They propose extending 1,140 funded hours to all two-year-olds regardless of parental working status, and providing 570 funded hours for all children aged six months to two years by 2031. Crucially, they also propose allowing the funding for under-twos to be used either in a childcare setting or as a cash transfer to support a parent who chooses to stay at home. While a universal offer has greater potential to reduce child poverty than a working-parents-only model, the cash transfer element risks undermining the core rationale for universal early years provision. Children whose parents choose to remain at home would be less likely to access early years education, widening rather than narrowing developmental inequalities – the opposite of what a universal childcare policy is intended to achieve.
The additional cost of these new childcare commitments is compounded by the proposal to raise the school starting age to seven. Extending publicly funded early years provision by two years implies a significant additional fiscal commitment that the manifesto makes no reference to whatsoever.
The Greens also propose a Universal Basic Income (UBI) pilot, contingent on UK Government agreement, so the Greens would not be obligated to deliver this. UBI is a hugely costly policy, and without any indication of where these funds would come from, seems pretty undeliverable.
Overall, the Greens make no acknowledgement of the long-term sustainability concerns of welfare spending in Scotland. Their proposals, including introducing a ‘double lock’ to ensure payments aimed at children rise annually with the higher of inflation or earnings growth will exacerbate these issues without clear indication of how they intend to fund this.
Health and social care
The Greens have a long list of health and social care commitments, but almost none come with costings or an indication of where funding would come from, making it impossible to assess whether the ambitions are remotely deliverable within a realistic budget.
Among the many proposals are a GP ratio target of one GP per 1,000 patients with guaranteed 15-minute appointments, nurse-to-patient ratios across all health and care settings, and free dental treatment. These are meaningful ambitions that would genuinely help an NHS struggling to meet demand. But the workforce planning and funding implications are substantial and entirely unaddressed.
On social care, the Greens propose a minimum of £15 per hour, with pay parity between NHS and social care nurses – a commitment likely to imply a wage bill well above the £15 floor. This is a meaningful commitment to a chronically underpaid workforce. However, the manifesto does not address whether local authorities would receive additional funding to cover these costs or be expected to absorb them within existing budgets.
The Greens also propose requesting that the UK Government reimburses Scottish third sector organisations for increased employer National Insurance contributions, which they estimate at £75 million per year. This funding depends entirely on UK Government agreement that seems unlikely to be forthcoming. If any spending commitments in the manifesto are predicated on receiving this money, they should be treated as undeliverable without cuts elsewhere or further tax rises.
Education
The Green’s commitment to raise the school starting age to seven and introduce a play-based kindergarten stage for three- to six-year-olds is a significant structural reform. The manifesto does not discuss how the qualified kindergarten teachers required to deliver this would be recruited, or how the extension of publicly funded provision by two years would be funded – a gap that is particularly striking given the scale of the early years commitments elsewhere in the manifesto.
The proposal to end temporary teacher contracts through ringfenced council funding is a sensible labour market intervention with the potential to improve teacher recruitment and retention. However, the manifesto does not address whether local government would receive sufficient additional funding to cover the cost, or be expected to absorb it within already constrained budgets.
Notably, any commitment on college funding is absent from the Greens’ ‘wish list’ of policies, providing only a vague aspiration to support colleges in maximising private sector income. Given the significant funding cuts the colleges sector has experienced over the last parliament this is a notable gap compared to other manifestos released so far.
Energy and housing
On energy, the Green’s £600 million renewables investment programme and doubling of Just Transition funding to £1 billion are among the few specific spending commitments in the manifesto. Scotland’s capital budget is already under significant pressure, and the source of this funding is not identified. If it is to come from existing capital budgets, delivery would require reprioritisation away from other projects currently in the pipeline.
On housing, the target of 15,700 social homes per year would suggest delivery of 78,500 social homes by the end of the parliament. If delivered, this would be a significant investment in social housing stock which could help alleviate some of the housing pressures in Scotland. However, without knowing how this construction will be funded, it is not clear whether delivery of this policy is realistic. The requirement that all new homes meet net zero standards is sensible in principle but will increase build costs, adding further difficulty to delivery within constrained capital budgets.
The Green’s package of rental reforms – including rent controls, extended notice periods, eviction bans, and compensation requirements – is the most comprehensive of any party. We discuss the impaction of these policies later, but it is worth flagging the tension between these tenant protections and housing supply could lead to a compounding, rather than alleviating, of the housing supply constraints.
Public sector reform
Unlike some of the other parties, the Greens have been less forthcoming with their plans for public sector efficiency cost savings. They plan to implement a ‘worker-led reform programme for the public sector, which improves performance and makes savings’ but provide no further details on how this will be achieved. They do suggest considering ‘shared backroom services’ but there is no firm commitment on how they hope to drive public sector efficiency. It’s also worth noting that this sort of shared back-office services is already commonplace, and therefore unlikely to deliver significant further savings.
Overall level of detail
This is a long manifesto. It is nearly double the length of any other manifesto released so far, and it is full of policy proposals. As in the case of the Labour manifesto, this feels like a shopping list of ideas – a step before the prioritisation one would expect from a government. Perhaps that’s to be expected if some of these policies are to be traded for support for a potential government. But it doesn’t feel like we know much more about what the Scottish Greens would see as their main priorities than we did before trawling through these 165 pages.
It’s disappointing to see a complete lack of costings throughout the manifesto. Apart from small pledges of particular amounts for the Nature Restoration Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the renewables investment programme, none of the proposals come with either an amount expected to be raised or how much they might cost. It’s worth noting that the Greens have made a virtue of not fully costing their manifesto, calling the concept “misleading.” We respectfully disagree – surely voters should expect a party to provide enough information to assess the overall impact of their proposals on Scotland’s already fragile public finances.
There are particular areas where there are policies that economists would agree might have positive effects. For example, council tax is a woefully outdated and regressive tax, and the Greens are the first party this campaign to propose tackling its issues and replacing it with something more sensible.
But other proposals are less rooted in economic efficiency. For example, the proposals to hike LBTT rates would likely slow transactions significantly, which would make moving home more difficult – and therefore create a less efficient housing market.
As a set of coherent policies, the Scottish Greens’ manifesto is unserious at best. The lack of even a cursory attempt at adding up the price tag of such a large change in tax and spending policy makes it impossible to scrutinise its fiscal responsibility in a meaningful way. A Scottish Wealth Tax is treated as a throwaway line, when it would have large implications for tax administration and very uncertain revenues. Income tax proposals lack any detail: the pledge to “retain a progressive and redistributive Income Tax system” is compatible with so many different tax schedules as to be meaningless.
There is a lack of acknowledgement of any trade-offs throughout the manifesto, including regarding the Fiscal Framework in which the Scottish Government has to operate and its fiscal constraints. But nowhere is it more evident than in the Scottish Greens’ proposals for intervening in the rental market.
The manifesto pledges to increase income tax rates on property income and to transfer the liability of council tax to the landlord. In both those cases, the return to owning the asset decreases, and so we would expect rents to go up in response – even if perhaps not fully immediately. But the Greens also intend to introduce rent controls to stop landlords from passing these costs onto tenants, while also hiking LBTT and additional dwelling supplement rates on those that might be interested in purchasing those properties.
This has all the hallmarks of freezing the property market and causing landlords stop renting out properties, thereby reducing the supply of properties available for renters. If supply has shrunk enough, the price would be expected to go up to entice more landlords to rent out properties, thereby adjusting market outcomes. In the absence of the ability to do that formally, we would likely see what has been seen in places such as South Korea, New York City and other places that have introduced rent control: increases in non-rent payments such as entry fees, administration fees, a deterioration of the quality of the housing stock, and outright illegal conduct through subletting and side payments with fewer or no protections for those living in properties.
It’s true that there are plenty of unscrupulous landlords and the cost of housing is a real issue. But for a whole host of reasons, it’s not realistic to expect – nor might it be desirable – for every occupier of a home to be its owner. Of course, defenders of the Greens’ position would point to the social rented sector as a way to provide rented property at a lower cost to tenants.
But by its own definition, social housing is below market rates, and so requires a subsidy. Given how stretched the public finances are, it seems unrealistic that all this would be funded by government, and social housing therefore requires higher rents in other properties for investors to be able to cross-subsidise it. If investment on private rental craters, there’s a real chance social housing construction will too.
The real way to bring down housing costs is to expand supply. But that requires large housebuilding programmes and likely higher, faster, cheaper and less conditional approvals of building applications. Solutions that actively restrict supply while intending to prevent prices rising are fighting against how people behave in real life, and seem doomed to fail.
This work is supported by the Nuffield Foundation. The Nuffield Foundation is an independent charitable trust with a mission to advance social well-being. It funds and undertakes rigorous research, encourages innovation and supports the use of sound evidence to inform social and economic policy, and improve people’s lives. The Nuffield Foundation is the founder and co-funder of the Nuffield Council on Bioethics, the Ada Lovelace Institute and the Nuffield Family Justice Observatory. Find out more at: nuffieldfoundation.org.
The views expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Foundation.
Authors
Ciara is a Knowledge Exchange Associate at the Fraser of Allander Institute. Her main area of focus is macroeconomic and fiscal analysis. She has recently completed a secondment to the Scottish Fiscal Commission, where she worked as an Economic and Fiscal Analyst in the economy team forecasting macroeconomic conditions.
João is Deputy Director and Senior Knowledge Exchange Fellow at the Fraser of Allander Institute. Previously, he was a Senior Fiscal Analyst at the Office for Budget Responsibility, where he led on analysis of long-term sustainability of the UK's public finances and on the effect of economic developments and fiscal policy on the UK's medium-term outlook.

